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INTRODUCTION
The last twenty years have seen a dramatic rise in commercial
gambling across the United States. One by one, states have enacted gaming-enabling legislation in an effort to promote economic
development and increase tax revenue from formerly illegal activities. Recently, legislators have begun to tap into major metropolitan markets by licensing casinos in closer proximity to highly
populated areas, and even in some of the nation’s largest cities.
Many politicians and businessmen view gaming as a powerful economic and tourism development tool. The bright lights, ringing
bells, and the prospect of large winnings all contribute to the allure
of casino gambling. Unfortunately, some patrons experience the
negative effects attendant to gambling. Additionally, as an industry notorious for illicit behavior, gambling must be heavily regulated to best balance the intended benefits with the wide variety of
potential side-effects.
These issues can become increasingly complex when gaming proponents seek to place casinos in urban areas. For the past few
years, the casino issue has proven highly controversial in Philadelphia. After Pennsylvania State Legislators decided that the City of
Brotherly Love would play host to two slot machine parlors, by
passing the Pennsylvania Race Horse Development and Gaming
Act, the process has been anything but smooth. Many citizens
groups and local politicians have expressed grave concern over
having casinos in Philadelphia and have tried to create a role for
local government in regulating gaming. Over four years later, casino developers have yet to break ground in Philadelphia. So far,
few new jobs have been created, and only attorneys and the Justices of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court have seen an increase in
the demand for their labor. A host of lawsuits have indefinitely
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delayed the process of building casinos in Philadelphia. Many of
these problems could have been avoided if Philadelphians had
been given an opportunity to participate in the matter. At a minimum, local actors could have been able to voice their opinions on
gaming and the two casinos intended for the city.
This Note focuses on the ability of local governmental bodies
and local actors to become involved when a state seeks to introduce casino-based gaming or license additional casino properties.
Traditionally, states retain the power to make most gaming-related
decisions, sometimes only allowing simple “yes or no” voter referenda. This Note argues that an increased role for local actors in
bringing gaming to cities will best protect the interests of the people most affected by casinos.
Part I provides a brief background of gambling in America and
the key aspects of gaming-enabling legislation in various states.
Part II discusses local government law and theory. Part III examines aspects of casino gambling that highlight the importance of
local involvement in the legislative and regulatory process. It also
discusses case studies of commercial casino development in Philadelphia and Detroit. Part IV compares the introduction of gaming
in the two cities to better understand the successful introduction of
casinos in Detroit.
I.

GAMING

Gaming or gambling is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as
“the act of risking something of value, esp. money, for a chance to
win a prize.”1 Gamblers participate in the activity by placing wagers2 in a variety of formats. Gaming is regulated at both the federal and state level.3 Federal gambling statues primarily serve to
prohibit gaming activities and related financial transactions. In the
United States there are five types of legal gaming: (1) charitable
gaming, (2) commercial casino gaming, (3) lotteries, (4) Native
American gaming, (5) and “pari-mutuel” wagering.4
1. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 701 (8th ed. 2004).
2. Id. at 1610 (defining “wager” as “1. Money or other consideration risked on an
uncertain event; a bet or gamble. 2. A promise to pay money or other consideration
on the occurrence of an uncertain event”).
3. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1084 (1994); 31 U.S.C. §§ 5361-5367 (2006).
4. AM. GAMING ASS’N, U.S. COMMERCIAL CASINO INDUSTRY: FACTS AT YOUR
FINGERTIPS 3 (2008), available at http://www.americangaming.org/assets/files/uploads/
REVISED_FAYFT_PDF_FINAL_FEB_2008.pdf (internal citation omitted) [hereinafter “FACTS AT FINGERTIPS”].
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Commercial casino gaming is the largest segment of the gaming
market.5 Casinos typically offer “banked” games in which the casino itself is participating in the game by taking wagers from patrons.6 Commercial casinos exist in a variety of forms, the most
recognizable being Las Vegas-style casinos, which are land-based
and typically include entertainment and hospitality facilities beyond gaming.7 Another common type of casino is the riverboat
casino. Riverboat casinos exist in two distinct forms, “excursion”
(mobile), and “dockside” (permanently moored boats).8 An additional form is the “racino,” a casino that is located at a previously
existing “pari-mutuel” racetrack facility.9 Commercial casinos are
extremely popular in the United States as 56.2 million people made
371 million trips to casinos in 2006.10
Pari-mutuel wagering is a form of gaming in which the total prize
pool is based on the amount of money wagered by all participants.11 Americans participate in pari-mutuel wagering when betting on horseracing, dog racing, jai alai, or similar games and
events.12 Forty-three states have authorized pari-mutuel wagering.13 The racino form of commercial casino gambling involves
other forms of gaming being introduced at a licensed pari-mutuel
facility.14
A.

The History of Gaming in America

While the commercial casino many Americans associate with
gambling is a recent invention, humans have been gambling for
thousands of years.15 Throughout history, governments have taken
an active role in regulating gambling, frequently levying taxes on
the activity.16 The rationales behind gaming regulation have varied
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. AM. GAMING ASS’N, 2007 STATE OF THE STATES: THE AGA SURVEY OF CASINO ENTERTAINMENT 7 (2007), available at http://www.americangaming.org/assets/
files/aga_2007_sos.pdf [hereinafter AGA SURVEY].
11. See FACTS AT FINGERTIPS, supra note 4, at 3.
12. Id.
13. AM. GAMING ASS’N, GENERAL INDUSTRY INFORMATION, http://www.american
gaming.org/Industry/factsheets/general_info_detail.cfv?id=15 (last visited Sept. 21,
2008).
14. See FACTS AT FINGERTIPS, supra note 4, at 3.
15. See Ronald J. Rychlak, The Introduction of Casino Gambling: Public Policy
and the Law, 64 MISS. L.J. 291, 294-98 (1995).
16. See id.
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in different eras and across cultural boundaries.17 Some governments simply sought to raise revenue, while others forbade or severely limited gambling as contrary to religious ideals.18
When settlers first came to what is now the United States, they
brought gambling with them, eventually leading Puritan leaders to
enact gaming regulation as they felt that gambling was a waste of
time and therefore part of the greater sin of idleness.19 Nonetheless, America was developed with funds derived from gambling;
colonial governments used lotteries to finance the development of
the colonies as they lacked the power to tax residents directly.20
Following this lead, many early American ventures relied on lotteries to raise revenue.21 However, around the turn of the nineteenth
century state governments began to legislate against lotteries, and
by the time of the Civil War there was a nearly nationwide ban on
gambling activity.22
In the post-Civil War era gambling reemerged in various forms.23
Some southern states returned to lotteries to address financial
hardships.24 Additionally, gambling was prevalent on riverboats
cruising the Mississippi and in gaming halls and saloons across the
expanding Western frontier.25 Unfortunately, gambling was frequently accompanied by negative side-effects such as crime, violence, and poverty. State sanctioned lotteries eventually fell victim
to criminal influences, leading regulators to end this form of legalized gambling.26
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id. at 299.
21. See id. at 299-300. Rychlak provides examples such as Ivy League Universities, the Revolutionary War effort, and the establishment of hundreds of religious
institutions. Id.
22. See I. Nelson Rose, The Legalization and Control of Casino Gambling, 8
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 235, 235 n.1 (1980). Professor Rose explains that anti-lottery
forces were influential in brining a halt to lotteries in all states other than Delaware
Kentucky, and Missouri. Id.
23. See id. (“The most infamous lottery of this time was the ‘Louisiana Lottery’
which was operated in New Orleans by New York gambling syndicate and penetrated
every state of the nation despite anti-lottery laws.”).
24. See id. at 245 n.1.
25. See DENISE VON HERMANN, THE BIG GAMBLE: THE POLITICS OF LOTTERY
AND CASINO EXPANSION 41 (2002) (referencing various forms of illegal and quasilegal forms of gambling in Colorado “going back as far as the times of westward
expansion and the great Gold Rush of the 1800s”).
26. See Rose, supra note 22, at 235 n.1.
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The demise of lotteries brought gambling to a halt by the end of
the nineteenth century.27 As states continued to pass laws prohibiting gambling, many local governments took an active role in enforcing the bans, as well as creating local ordinances that further
defined what types of gambling-related conduct were illegal.28 The
bases for modern gaming regulation legislation are rooted in the
legal frameworks banning both commercial gaming and various
types of illegal gambling.29
Like many activities prohibited by the government, gambling did
not wither and die.30 Extensive illegal gambling, ranging from underground card rooms and lotteries to bookmakers involved in
sports gambling persisted.31 Unfortunately, despite the development of a wide array of legalized gambling, the criminal element
followed gaming into the modern era. As aspects of gambling are
“easy to manipulate and have historically been subject to fraud,”32
both organized and white-collar crime have been associated with
the industry.33 Gambling in America’s first casino town, Las
Vegas, was in part developed and controlled by organized criminal
enterprises.34 “Street crime” has also been a problem associated
with gambling.35 Many compulsive gamblers resort to crime to finance their habits; others become mired in alcohol and illicit drug
abuse. The long-standing presence of both illegal gambling and related crimes have proven that strict regulatory schemes are necessary to mitigate these societal harms.
For most of the twentieth century, states statutorily banned gambling, and many allowed local governments to enact specific gam27. See Rychlak, supra note 15, at 302-03.
28. Paul D. Delva, The Promises and Perils of Legalized Gambling for Local Governments: Who Decides How to Stack the Deck?, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 847, 852-55 (1995).
29. See e.g., id. at 852 (“Although more and more forms of gambling are permitted
by state law, the practice remains largely prohibited in the United States by civil or
criminal laws. Indeed, the increasing promotion of state-sponsored gambling contradicts state constitutional prohibitions and extensive criminalization of gambling in
state law.”).
30. See Rose, supra note 22, at 249-51.
31. Professor Rose describes various forms of continuing illegal gambling including “numbers” games, sports betting with bookies, and both cards and dice games. Id.
32. E.L. Grinols & J.D. Omorov, Development or Dreamfield Delusions?: Assessing Casino Gambling’s Costs and Benefits, 16 J.L. & COM. 49, 53 (1996).
33. Id. at n.11.
34. See VON HERMANN, supra note 25, at 11 (“The image of casinos was linked for
many years to the mob-controlled Las Vegas casinos such as the Flamingo, which was
built in 1946 by ‘Bugsy’ Siegel.”).
35. See id.
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ing-related laws.36 Some local governments further suppressed
gaming activities, often enacting much harsher limitations than
those imposed by state laws.37 The power for local governments to
pass these types of laws stems either from direct grants by the state
legislature within the legislative scheme or is implied by a lack of
statutory language reserving all rights to control gaming with the
state.38
On the other hand, some state statutory schemes preempt local
governments from promulgating laws related to gaming.39 As with
other issues of local control, if state law comprehensively controls
an area of law, such as gaming, courts traditionally defer to the
state and prohibit the local actors from taking independent action.40 Additionally, if a state’s constitution contains provisions regarding gambling, courts will usually limit local government
attempts to promote or suppress such activities.41
B.

The Modern Era: Casino Gaming

Today gaming is one of the most highly profitable42 and strictly
regulated43 industries in the United States, with legalized commercial gambling occurring in all but two states.44 Although Nevada
legalized casino gaming in 193145, the modern era of gambling in
the United States truly began in the 1960s.46 In 1964, New Hampshire became the first state to host a modern lottery,47 prompting
36. See Delva, supra note 28, at 854.
37. See id at 854-55. Delva provides examples from courts of multiple states upholding local ordinances aimed at restricting gambling and like activities. Contra
Rose, supra note 22, at 250-52 (using the term “benign prohibition” to describe how
local governments frequently did not enforce gambling-related laws for a variety of
reasons).
38. See Delva, supra note 28, at 854.
39. See id.
40. See id. at 854-55.
41. See id. at 854 (describing judicial treatment of the Louisiana Constitution
when the Louisiana Supreme Court “held that . . . constitutional language creates in
the legislature the exclusive right to define and suppress illegal gambling activities”).
42. According to the American Gaming Association, gross gaming revenues in
2006 totaled $32.42 billion. AGA SURVEY, supra note 10, at 2.
43. See FACTS AT FINGERTIPS, supra note 4, at 6.
44. See id. at 3.
45. See id. at 4.
46. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 22, at 245 n.1 (stating that a “third wave” of legalized gambling in America kicked off when New Hampshire authorized a lottery in
1964); Rychlak, supra note 15, at 303 (“From the turn of the century until the mid
1960’s, there was fairly little legalized gambling and no state sponsored gambling in
the United States. Overall . . . legal gambling was at a historic low in this nation.”).
47. See FACTS AT FINGERTIPS, supra note 4, at 3.
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many other states to provide for legalized forms of gambling in the
following years.48 Yet, for nearly fifty years Nevada would remain
the only home to casinos in America. It was not until 1976 that
New Jersey passed legislation aimed at revitalizing the beach resort
of Atlantic City through the introduction of casinos.49 The New
Jersey legislature wanted to ensure the propriety of the industry by
limiting casinos to Atlantic City as well as various other restrictive
policies.50 New Jersey’s entrance into the world of gaming brought
the state sizeable tax revenues, and in turn opened the eyes of
many American legislators to the benefits of playing host to casinos. The last twenty years have seen a dramatic rise in gambling
activity in the United States: there are now twenty states hosting
commercial casinos.51
While most states share the primary goals of increasing tax revenue and economic development when introducing casino gambling,
enabling legislation and gaming regulation differ greatly from state
to state. Some regulatory schemes place limits on the number or
location of gaming facilities, while others choose to restrict the
games that operators can conduct in their facilities. No matter the
stated goals of introducing gaming, all states have implemented
some form of regulation to protect gamblers, prevent crime, and
mitigate potentially negative side-effects of gaming.52
In creating a regulatory structure, state legislators must fully
consider the benefits that they hope their state will receive from
gaming operations, and define a set of goals for their state.53
48. See id.
49. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-1(4) (West 1995) (“Legalized casino gaming has been
approved by the citizens of New Jersey as a unique tool of urban redevelopment for
Atlantic City. In this regard, the introduction of a limited number of casino rooms in
major hotel convention complexes, permitted as an additional element in the hospitality industry of Atlantic City, will facilitate the redevelopment of exiting blighted areas
and the refurbishing and expansion of existing hotel, convention, tourist, and entertainment facilities; encourage the replacement of lost hospitality-oriented facilities;
provide for judicious used of open space for leisure time and recreational activities;
and attract new investment capital to New Jersey in general and to Atlantic City in
particular.”).
50. See id.
51. See FACTS AT FINGERTIPS, supra note 4, at 3. This figure does not include
states that have entered into gaming agreements pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.
52. Cory Aronovitz, The Regulation of Commercial Gaming, 5 CHAP. L. REV. 181,
181 (2002) (explaining that gaming regulation aims to promote integrity in gaming
operations and instill confidence in gamblers that gaming operators are treating them
fairly).
53. Id. at 182-88. Aronovitz defines the two main motivations for gaming regulation regarding economic benefits of and reaction to market competition. He further
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Lawmakers should also clearly define a comprehensive public policy when enabling gaming.54 Moreover, all comprehensive gaming
laws should address licensing, operational controls, law enforcement, taxation, and accounting and auditing functions.55
Three dominant models for regulation have developed: the “Nevada model,” the “New Jersey model,”56 and various “Hybrid models.”57 The Nevada model of gaming regulation seeks to maximize
economic benefits by creating a relatively free environment for
gaming operators to respond to market demand for their services,
while still ensuring that operations are legitimate.58 Nevada gaming legislation neither limits the number of gaming licenses available in the state nor places geographic restrictions on gaming
facilities. The New Jersey legislature took a vastly different approach to gaming regulation. The New Jersey regulatory model focuses on the potential negative effects of casino gaming and
reserves power to the state over nearly every aspect of the casino
industry.59 One similarity between the two models is that both
states rely on two separate administrative bodies to regulate gambreaks down the potential economic benefits of introducing gaming as economic revitalization, new employment opportunities, tax revenue, and increased levels of tourism. He then articulates the potential for each type of economic benefit and explains
that expectations frequently fall short once gaming moves from planning to the operational stage. Id.
54. Id. at 189. Aronovitz outlines a three-step process for creating gaming-enabling legislation: determining public policy, defining goals, and implementing legislation. Aronovitz contends that the implementation stage is unique and requires skills
outside of the expertise of most legislators. Id.
55. See id. at 189-94. The licensing element of the law is a chief concern, as it will
control who may own and operate casinos, where the casinos may be placed and who
may work and manage gaming related activities. The licensing component of a comprehensive gaming law is most important for this Note, since it is the primary area
where local actors can become involved in the process and influence the effects that
gaming will have on their locality. Although other factors are important to the overall
impact of gaming, I believe that those functions are best served by an administrative
agency or agencies with the requisite expertise in the field.
56. See id. at 190; see also NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N, NATIONAL
GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMMISSION FINAL REPORT 3-5 to 3-6 (1999), available at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/3.pdf. [hereinafter NGISC]; Alvin J. Hicks,
No Longer the Only Game in Town: A Comparison of the Nevada and New Jersey
Regulatory Systems of Gaming Control, 12 SW. U. L. REV. 583, 585-89 (1980-1981).
57. Aronovitz, supra note 52, at 190-91.
58. NGISC, supra note 56, at 3-5. While there are few limits on the number and
location of casinos, the state is highly involved in policing the industry. Id.
59. Id. The fact that gambling in New Jersey is restricted to Atlantic City reflects
the philosophy that unrestrained gambling can prove disastrous for the state and its
residents. Id.
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ing.60 The third framework, the “Hybrid” model, has been used by
many of the states that introduced casino gaming in the last twenty
years.61 Hybrid models typically limit the number of gaming establishments and rely on a singular agency to perform all regulatory
functions related to the industry.62 The Hybrid model has proven
popular and is in place in one form or another in many of the jurisdictions that have legalized gaming.63
Within these greater regulatory frameworks gaming legislation
varies greatly. One such aspect of gaming legislation is the level of
involvement for local actors in the gaming-enabling and casino licensing process. Local involvement in the process includes both
actions taken by local governments and by voters who can voice
their opinion by voting on the legality of gambling in their state,
city, or county.
1. Voter Approval of Gaming-Enabling Legislation
In order for casino gaming to be legalized in a state, that state
must take action to pass gaming enabling legislation or modify current laws to enable new forms of wagering.64 Some states require
voter approval before bills can pass into laws and the process of
enabling gaming can begin. For example, the voters of New
Jersey65 and Michigan66 participated in statewide referenda approving commercial gaming in their respective states, while voters
60. Aronovitz, supra note 52, at 190. Both Nevada and New Jersey separate the
administrative investigation and enforcement functions from those of administrative
decision-making. Id.
61. Id.
62. NGISC, supra note 56, at 3-6. Mississippi has a unique regulatory scheme in
which one agency is in charge of all functions like the other “hybrid” jurisdictions but
(like Nevada) has no limit on gaming facilities, and (like New Jersey) puts limits on
the potential location of properties. Id.
63. Aronovitz, supra note 52, at 190-91.
64. I. Nelson Rose, Pennsylvania’s New Slot Law, 9 GAMING L. REV. 111, 111
(2005) [hereinafter Rose, New Slot Law] (“Legalizing gambling is not the same as
decriminalizing it. When a state’s lawmakers decide to make gaming legal, they never
repeal the state’s criminal anti-gambling statutes. Instead, the legislature creates a
licensing system for operators and suppliers. A license has such great commercial
value because it allows the holder to do something which would otherwise send that
person to jail. Lawmakers have to decide what forms of gaming will be allowed and
how many licenses will be issued.”).
65. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-1(b)(4) (West 1995) (“Legalized casino gaming has
been approved by the citizens of New Jersey as a unique tool of urban redevelopment
for Atlantic City.”).
66. See MICH. GAMING CONTROL BD., PROPOSAL E BALLOT LANGUAGE AND RESULTS http://www.michigan.gov/mgcb/0,1607,7-120-1382_1450-12939—,00.html. (last
visited March 1, 2008). The vote on allowing casino gaming in Detroit was extremely
close, with only 51.5% of voters in favor of gaming. Id.
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did not have the opportunity to voice their opinions at the state
level in Pennsylvania or Iowa.67 Statewide referenda voting on
gaming allows all voters, not only those in close proximity to potential casinos to participate in the decision-making process.
Another form of direct democratic participation in gamingenabling legislation is voter referenda at the local level. Gamingenabling legislation can limit citizen participation in the gaming enabling process by allowing only those in the city or county where a
potential gaming establishment would be located to vote on the
issues. For instance, gaming legislation in both Iowa68 and Mississippi69 provides for votes at the county level before a riverboat casino can be issued a license to dock and begin gaming operations.
One key distinction between the two states is that in Iowa the state
legislature requires a county referendum as part of the licensing
procedure, whereas in Mississippi local residents must take affirmative steps to compel a vote on the issue.70 Additionally, the Iowa
gaming statutes also require voters to re-approve gambling in their
county at predetermined dates or intervals.71
An alternative to approval by voters is approval of gaming by
local lawmakers. For example the Michigan Gaming & Control
Act (“MGCA”) requires that the local legislative body in any city
that is eligible for gaming enact an ordinance approving of gaming.72 As Detroit was the only city eligible for gaming under the
act, the affirmative approval of the Detroit government was necessary for the act to have effect.
2.

Local Involvement in the Casino Licensing Process

The distribution of gaming licenses is a key aspect of gamingenabling legislation.73 Licenses are required for the casino as a
whole, casino ownership, employees in various roles, and even
gaming equipment suppliers.74 The decision to issue gaming licenses is typically vested in an administrative agency.75 Investiga67. AM. GAMING ASS’N, INDUSTRY STATISTICS BY STATE, http://www.american
gaming.org/Industry/state/statistics.cfm (last visited Mar. 1, 2008).
68. IOWA CODE ANN. § 99.F.7.11.a. (West 1996) (regarding riverboat gambling);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 99.F.7.11.c (West 1996) (regarding licensing gambling games at
licensed pari-mutuel racetracks).
69. MISS. CODE ANN. §19-3-79 (West 1994).
70. Id.
71. IOWA CODE ANN. § 99.F.7.11.d (West 1996).
72. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 432.206(1)(a) (West 2001).
73. See Aronovitz supra note 52, at 191-95.
74. See id.
75. See id.
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tions into applicants’ backgrounds are conducted in order to
comply with laws regulating everything from criminal history to
conflict of interest with political figures and connection to other
gaming ventures.76 States such as New Jersey and Nevada have
independent agencies for the investigative and licensing functions.77 In contrast, Pennsylvania vested both the authority to investigate applicants and to make all licensing decisions in the
Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board.78
Local government actors may also play a role in determining
which applicants can receive gaming licenses. Factors such as location, prospective overall economic impact and the applicants’ prior
gaming experience are considered in determining who should be
licensed.79 For example, pursuant to the MGCA, local government
is highly involved in choosing which proposed casinos are eligible
for licensing, as applicants must contract with the city of Detroit
before applying for licensure.80 Prior to submitting an application
to the gaming board, all applicants must enter into a “certified development agreement” with Detroit.81 Development agreements
address areas of critical concern to local government, including but
not limited to location, zoning, and infrastructure.82 In Illinois, the
power to decide if gaming will happen in a specific city or county
rests in the hands of local government actors as part of the licensing process.83
II.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

To understand the importance of granting local actors a role in
the complex process of bringing casino gaming to a particular city
or county, it is important to recognize the basic principles of local
government law: the traditional nature of local legislative bodies in
our political system and the developments that have led to the
prevalence of “home rule” governments. Additionally, aspects of
local government scholarship are important to consider in the con76. See id.
77. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
78. See infra note 177.
79. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 432.202(r) (West 2001).
80. See id. § 432.206(1)(b).
81. Id. Detroit may only have three pending development agreements at any
given time. Id. § 432.206(2). If the board denies licensure to an applicant, the city is
allowed to enter into another development agreement. Id.
82. See § 432.202(r).
83. See 230 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 10/7-3 (West 2003).
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text of the legislative process concerning enabling commercial
gaming.
A.

Principles of Local Government in America

Local governments exist in a curious form, as they are nearly
wholly subordinate to their state. City and other local governments have no innate power to act unilaterally.84 The U.S. Constitution provides no rights for local governments against their
states85 and they are neither recognized nor provided for within
our governmental system.86 Therefore, Americans have no inherent right to governance at the local level.87 Local governments’
existence and authority are established by their home state alone.88
This results in a relationship in which the local government can be
seen as a “delegate”89 or “agent”90 of the state, acting with powers
limited to those granted by the state.91 The range of local government powers were traditionally defined by “Dillon’s Rule,”92 which
states that if there is ambiguity regarding the power of a local government to take a specific action, a court should assume that the
local authority does not have that power.93 Therefore, without an
express grant of power to take action on a specific subject, local
governments were subordinate to their state legislatures.
In the era following the Civil War, many states enabled local
governmental actors by amending their constitutions to include
home rule.94 Home rule amendments allowed localities to take
control of issues of local concern through the adoption of their own
84. Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1062
(1980).
85. Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local Government
Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7 (1990) [hereinafter Briffault, Our Localism].
86. Frayda S. Bluestein, Do North Carolina Local Governments Need Home
Rule?, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1983, 1985 (2006).
87. Briffault, Our Localism, supra note 85, at 7.
88. See id. Professor Briffault states that “local government is a creature of the
state. It exists only by an act of the state, and the state, as creator, has plenary power
to alter, expand, contract or abolish at will any or all local units.” Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See id.; see also Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907) (“Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the state, created as convenient agencies
for exercising such of the governmental powers of the state as may be intrusted to
them.”).
92. Briffault, Our Localism, supra note 85, at 8 (“Dillon’s Rule operates as a standard of delegation, a canon of construction and a rule of limited power.”).
93. See id.
94. See id. at 10.
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charters and ultimately their own legislative initiatives.95 Local
governments operating under home rule are presumed to have the
power to regulate any matter that does not run afoul of state law.
While many home rule provisions compel local governments to refrain from taking actions at odds with state law,96 conflicts nonetheless arise. One pertinent example is the conflict between the
Philadelphia City Council and the Pennsylvania Gaming Control
Board.97 The judicial treatment of conflicts between local and state
actors determines the balance of power in a given state.98 As states
may dominate local actors in a particular area of the law,99 another
decisive factor in the balance of power is determining what issues
are considered state or local concerns.100
B.

Local Involvement and Control

Popular participation in the legislative process, local expertise,
and decision-making ability are important factors regarding the decisions made by legislators and administrative officials in promulgating both gaming-enabling legislation and a regulatory scheme
for the industry.
1.

Local Participation in the Political Process

“One of the hallmarks of governance at the state and local level
is direct democracy.”101 In certain situations, the ability to vote on
lawmakers for state office is insufficient to provide voters with
enough influence over important issues,102 and their interests are
best served by direct participation in the decision-making process.103 Most states provide their citizens with the ability to influ95. See id. (“The home rule movement had two goals: to undo Dillon’s Rule by
giving localities broad lawmaking authority and to provide local governments freedom from state interference in areas of local concern.”).
96. See Bluestein, supra note 86, at 1994.
97. See infra notes 216-32 and accompanying text.
98. See Bluestein, supra note 86, at 1994 (stating that judges frequently employ
preemption or implied preemption analysis).
99. See id. This approach is exemplified by the doctrine of implied preemption,
which entails an inquiry based on the premise that “the local action is invalid if the
court concludes that general laws indicate a legislative intent to foreclose local regulations on particular subjects.” Id.
100. See id. at 1998.
101. Richard Briffault, Beyond Congress: The Study of State and Local Legislatures, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 29 (2003) [hereinafter Briffault, Beyond
Congress].
102. See Frug, supra note 84, at 1069 (arguing that popular involvement in the decision-making process requires acting on the local level).
103. See Briffault, Beyond Congress, supra note 101, at 29-30.
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ence the legislative process through voter referenda, a process
giving voters final approval over legislation.104 Some states go a
step further and allow for voter-initiated legislation, providing voters with an opportunity to dictate state laws.105 The ability to direct aspects of the state lawmaking process encourages citizens to
become informed and assert control over their future, as participation is moot without true power.106 On the other hand, direct democracy allows people to potentially act without the proper
background knowledge or simply based on emotion.107 Therefore,
direct democracy cannot exist without limits as “the travails of democracy itself must be taken into account and carefully
weighed.”108 It is through the protections provided by state legislative action and judicial review that the devices of direct democracy
have “flourished as significant adjuncts in the overall governmental
scheme.”109
Another way for voters to make their voices heard is by electing
local government officials. “Democratic participation is presumably more possible at the local level, where government bodies and
public officials are more accessible and closer to home than they
are at the state or national level.”110 Local legislators also focus
their efforts of matters of local concern and thus must be responsive to their electorate. If local government proves unresponsive to
voters’ needs, those voters may be able to move to another locality
that they think will better serve their goals and desires.111 Further,
if local governments do not have the actual power to influence the

104. See id. Bills containing referenda requirements will not become law without
securing voter approval. Additionally, some states allow the use of “optional referenda,” which permit opponents to petition for a referendum that could strike down
the law. Id.
105. See id.
106. Frug, supra note 84, at 1070 (“Power and participation are inextricably linked:
a sense of powerlessness tends to produce apathy rather than participation, while the
existence of power encourages those able to participate in its exercise to do so.”).
107. Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Initiative and Referendum: The Trials of Direct Democracy, 70 ALA. L. REV. 1003, 1032 (2007) (“A recourse to direct democracy, regardless of the immediate provocation or remedial orientation, ought not to be taken
as a roving commission to dilute essential services or revenue sources, to endanger
individual rights or safeguards, or to undermine the independence of state courts.”).
108. Id. at 1033.
109. Id.
110. Richard Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 16 (2000)
[hereinafter Briffault, Localism and Regionalism].
111. See id.

R

\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\35-5\FUJ502.txt

1048

unknown

Seq: 16

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

4-NOV-08

13:11

[Vol. XXXV

areas most important to voters, there will be less incentive for political participation no matter the locale.112
2.

Local Expertise

“[W]hoever must wear the shoe knows best where it
pinches.”113

“The essence of home rule is to enable people of different communities to find different answers to the same question, to tailor
government action to local needs, circumstances and preferences.”114 Home rule has been described as “concerned with the
decentralization of decision-making to give a forum to those whose
lives are focused on the parochial—home, family, and neighborhood—and thus bring the government down to where the goats can
get at it.”115 From this perspective, home rule allows actors within
the local government to provide for their constituents in the most
responsive manner; local governments are more likely to understand “parochial” concerns and needs, and local governments’ interests are more closely aligned as members of the same
community.
Local governments have long been the primary actors in several
aspects of regulation, as well as providers of public services.116
Much of this local action has been responsible for determining the
character of our cities and counties. For example, local governments have long been recognized as the primary actor in matters of
zoning and land use.117 For over eighty years, local governments
have regulated land use through zoning.118 The ability to zone “is a
means by which groups can encourage uses of physical spaces that
112. See id. at 17; see also Frug, supra note 84, at 1067-70 & n.130 and accompanying text.
113. Michael Libonati, Home Rule: An Essay on Pluralism, 64 WASH. L. REV. 51,
71 (1989) (describing home rule in the context of a tradition of political discourse).
114. Richard Briffault, Home Rule for the Twenty-First Century, 36 URB. LAW. 253,
264 (2004). Professor Briffault argues for a “presumption of local power to act on
matters that affect the locality and people within it.” Id. Nonetheless, he states that
local action should be limited when regulations result in “cross-border consequences,
burden[ing] interlocal activity, or interfer[ance] with state policies that must apply
statewide.” Id.
115. Libonati, supra note 113, at 51.
116. See Briffault, Home Rule, supra note 114, at 256.
117. See Michael Hawkins, Casinos and Land Use: Law and Public Policy, 12
CONN. L. REV. 785, 789 (1980); see also Briffault, Our Localism, supra note 85, at 5758. Professor Briffault states that “[f]ew actions affect local life more than changes in
land use[,]” and then describes how local government actions had been widely upheld
in light of the common practice of exclusionary zoning policies. Id.
118. See Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Corp., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
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they like and discourage uses they do not like . . . .”119 For zoning
actions to be valid, statutes often require that actions be under a
comprehensive plan.120 Therefore continuity in actions taken by
local governments regarding land use is an important consideration
when casinos come to town.
C.

Regionalism and the Drawbacks of Local Control

“The theoretical case for localism rests on a set of arguments
about the role of local governments in promoting governmental efficiency, democracy and community. But in contemporary metropolitan areas, the economically, socially and ecologically relevant
area is often the region . . . Regionalism is, thus, localism, for metropolitan areas.”121 Advocates of regionalism argue that the interconnectedness of modern cities and suburbs requires governmental
cooperation in order to prevent critical matters being considered
by local actors in isolation.122 An important element of thinking in
regional terms is that actions taken by local governments frequently result in externalities.123 As “[l]ocal government law traditionally did not place obligations upon municipalities to examine
the impact of their decision making upon adjacent local governments or the region[,]” localities have taken actions focusing on
their best interests alone.124
In the context of popular participation, similar arguments exist
for regional governance as an alternative to local governments;
that those affected by decisions should have the ability to have input in choosing who will make those decisions.125 Advocates urge
that “[i]f the region is a real economic and sociological entity . . .
then it needs a coterminous political entity to promote and protect
its health, safety, and welfare.”126 Without having regional governance, voters who can only be heard at the state level can become
119. Richard C. Shragger, The Limits of Localism, 100 MICH. L. REV. 371, 374
(2001-2002).
120. BARLOW BURKE, UNDERSTANDING THE LAW OF ZONING AND LAND USE
CONTROLS, 87 (2002).
121. Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, supra note 110, at 2.
122. See Janice C. Griffith, Regional Governance Reconsidered, 21 J.L. & POL. 505,
509 (2005).
123. See Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, supra note 110, at 2.
124. Griffith, supra note 122, at 526. Professor Griffith highlights zoning as an area
of law in which municipalities knowingly take actions that would be detrimental to
their neighbors. Id.
125. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
126. Laurie Reynolds, Local Governments and Regional Governance, 39 URB. LAW.
483, 492 (2007).
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disenfranchised, as the actions of neighboring localities result in
potentially negative externalities.127 Nonetheless, currently no major metropolitan area has a governmental body capable of dealing
with problems on a regional level.128 Therefore, citizens must rely
on state governments and courts to limit local governmental actions resulting in negative externalities.
III.
A.

WHO SHOULD DECIDE IF, WHERE,
WE GAMBLE?

AND

HOW

States Motives for Controlling the Gaming-Enabling Process

The motivating factors for introducing casino gaming are a necessary starting point for evaluating the level of local involvement in
the process. Primarily, states turn to commercial gambling in order
to increase tax revenue,129 as the industry is subject to high rates of
taxation.130 Other motivating factors include, but are not limited
to: economic development and job creation, expansion of the tourism industry, and reaction to the legalization of gaming in neighboring states.131 Cities and counties who host casino gaming
usually hope to receive similar benefits from enabling gaming. As
tax revenue is a driving force behind legalized gaming for legislators, states frequently tax the gaming industry at rates above other
commercial ventures.132 As states have the power to place strict
limits on entry into the casino market, limiting competition for
gamblers wagers, corporations are willing to enter into the business
despite the steep tax structures.133 Since gaming legislation is enacted at the state level, it is possible to create a regulatory structure
entirely under state control. This approach allows for state legislators and administrative agencies, such as gaming control boards to
exclude local government from influencing the industry.
127. See Briffault, Localism and Regionalism, supra note 110, at 21-22 (“In metropolitan areas, democracy requires giving the regional electorate a voice in local decisions that have regional consequences. Only by widening the scale of participation to
include all of those affected by local actions can local decision-making in metropolitan
regions be made truly democratic.”).
128. See Reynolds, supra note 126, at 498-99.
129. Revenue generated from taxing casino profits is considered a “voluntary” tax
on citizens, since no one is required to engage in gaming. Rychlak, supra note 15, at
311-12. Politicians frequently favor this approach to revenue generation as a way to
fill state coffers without resorting to unpopular tax hikes. Id.
130. See Aronovitz, supra note 52, at 182.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See id.
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If gaming legislation allows for local involvement, the state’s
goals in introducing gaming might be frustrated by such action.134
For instance, if voters in a county in Iowa135 chose not to permit
casinos or riverboat docking, the state would not be able to license
gaming operations and therefore would not be able to gain tax revenues.136 Thus, limiting local involvement in the gaming-enabling
process could allow state legislatures and administrative agencies
to swiftly introduce gaming.
An important factor to consider in determining which parties
will be involved making gaming-related decisions is the implementation process. Properly implementing gaming legislation is critical
to the success of the industry.137 Putting gaming into action differs
greatly from other aspects of the legislative process.138 Implementation of a successful regulatory structure may require a different
set of skills and knowledge than other aspects of legislating commercial gaming.139 For this reason, lawmakers delegate the implementation and enforcement functions related to gaming to
regulatory agencies.140 A properly established regulatory agency
has the ability to control key aspects of industry and issue policies
without requiring legislative action.141 Thus, a gaming regulatory
agency has the ability to remain flexible and can react to market
changes to best serve both the industry and the public.142
B.

Local Ramifications of Casino Gaming

The primary argument for involving local actors in the enabling
and regulating gaming is that “the greatest impact [of gambling] is
felt at the local level.”143 The report issued after the most recent
comprehensive investigation of the gambling industry asserted the
need for local involvement in bringing gaming to a jurisdiction after acknowledging “the paucity of evidence of net impact derived
from the introduction of gambling into an area where is does not
134. See MICHAEL BELLETIRE, LEGISLATING AND REGULATING CASINO GAMING:
A VIEW FROM STATE REGULATORS 14 (1999), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/belletire.pdf.
135. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 118-24 (discussing the benefits and burdens related to direct
democracy).
137. See Aronovitz, supra note 52, at 189.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See id. at 204-05.
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See NGISC, supra note 56, at 7-16.
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already exist.”144 The report issued a clear recommendation, stating that “[t]he Commission is committed to the idea that local government agencies should make careful and informed decisions
about whether to permit gambling into their respective jurisdictions.”145 Local actors, whether or not they are involved in the legislative process must address many concerns related to commercial
gaming.
Local governments face a variety of social problems,146 such as
crime,147 as well as issues related to economic transformation,148
changes in ability to control land use,149 and increased demand on
services.150 These potentially negative externalities151 of gambling
should be carefully evaluated in the process of creating and implementing gaming legislation.152 While frequently removed from active participation in the process of bringing casino gaming into
144. See id. at 7-28.
145. See id.
146. See id. at 7-18 to 7-28. The section of the report titled “The Social Impact of
Gambling” includes the following subsections: “Problem and Pathological Gambling,” “Adolescent Gambling,” “Suicide,” “Divorce,” “Homelessness,” and “Abuse
and Neglect.” Id. Nearly all literature addressing gaming laws and the introduction
of gaming to a state or municipality devotes significant attention to the social costs
related to gambling as a chief concern in the legislative decision-making process. See
generally Aronovitz, supra note 52, at 199-202; Rychlak, supra note 15, at 328-60 (including environmental issues in discussion on the impacts of gambling).
147. There is considerable debate within gaming research about the relationship
between legalized gambling and crime levels. See NGISC, supra note 56, at 7-12 to 714; Lori Chapman, Riverboat Gambling in the Great Lakes Region: A Pot of Gold at
the End of the Rainbow or Merely “Fools Gold”, 26 U. TOL. L. REV. 387, 414 (1995)
(questioning whether a relationship exists between increased crime levels and the introduction of gaming). Nonetheless, experts are confident that organized crime has
been eliminated from ownership and operation of casinos. NGISC, supra note 56, at
3-1.
148. See infra Part III.B.2.
149. See generally Hawkins, supra note 117; Edward W. McClenathan, Land Use
Implications of Casinos and Racinos on Local Governments in New York State, 39
URB. LAW. 11 (2007).
150. See McClenathan, supra note 149, at 115; Rychlak, supra note 15, at 292 (“In
some parts of the State . . . traffic problems have multiplied, drainage and sewer systems are strained and social service are struggling to keep up with a growing homeless
population.”).
151. See EARL L.GRINOLS, GAMBLING IN AMERICA 25 (2004) (“A negative externality is a harmful effect that a firm or household’s choices have on other firms or
households and that does not operate through market forces.”).
152. See id. (“In the case of casinos, if an increase in the number of pathological
gamblers leads to social problems whose costs must be borne by those other than the
casinos, this is an externality. If the presence of casinos creates conditions that lead to
increase in crime that must be dealt with through money provided by public taxes,
then that is an externality. Casinos get the profits; society gets negative
externalities.”).
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existence, local governments end up with much of the responsibility to ensure that potential costs associated with gambling do not
outweigh the intended benefits to citizens.
1.

Social Problems

A wide of variety of social problems can arise in the presence of
casino gambling. While the net effect of these problems is difficult
to quantify,153 it is clear that gambling has negative effects on some
individuals and those individuals can negatively impact their communities. Specifically, gambling addiction and the related consequences must be kept in mind when state legislatures enable
gaming.154 Problem or compulsive gambling behavior is widespread.155 As legalizing gambling frequently results in the creation
of new gamblers,156 a city or county that embraces gambling will
likely see an increase in problem gambling activity.157 Although
states may be able to provide resources to help combat problem
gambling,158 much of the impact is felt in the communities where
problem gamblers reside. One important concern is that “poor
people tend to spend a disproportionate amount of their income on
legalized gambling.”159 Many services provided to those who cannot support themselves are furnished at the local level. Therefore,
local actors might be forced to bear the brunt of the costs associated with problem gamblers.
153. See NGISC, supra note 56, at 7-18. Much of the problem in assessing research
related to the social effects of gambling is that it has been performed on behalf of the
industry and therefore has the potential for bias. Id.
154. BELLETIRE, supra note 134, at 11-12.
155. The National Council on Problem Gaming defines “problem gaming” as
“[G]ambling behavior which causes disruptions in any major area of life: psychological, physical, social or vocational.” National Council on Gambling, http://www.ncp
gambling.org (last visited Sept. 7, 2008). The Council further states that:
The term ‘Problem Gambling’ includes, but is not limited to, the condition
known as ‘Pathological,’ or ‘Compulsive’ Gambling, a progressive addiction
characterized by increasing preoccupation with gambling, a need to bet more
money more frequently, restlessness or irritability when attempting to stop,
‘chasing’ losses, and loss of control manifested by continuation of the gambling behavior in spite of mounting, serious, negative consequences.
Id.
156. See Rychlak, supra note 15, at 336.
157. See id.
158. Methods for combating problem gambling include telephone hotlines for
problem gamblers, setting aside funds for treatment programs, training programs for
casino employees, and requirements related to casino advertising. See id.
159. Id. at 353. Rychlak notes that some casino jurisdictions, including Biloxi, Mississippi, have seen a rise in homelessness, demand on soup kitchens, and increased
numbers of pawn shops. Id.
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2. Economic Transformation
The introduction of casinos can result in positive economic
changes for both states and municipalities, but growth can come
with risks.160 A key concern for lawmakers is the effect that casinos can have on other businesses. While the potential for increased tourism can bring in new local revenue, frequently casinos
end up drawing mostly local customers.161 This can potentially result in local casino clientele spending less or no money at businesses they formerly patronized, resulting in “cannibalization,”162 a
phenomenon also known as the substitution effect. A recent study
indicates that introducing casinos does not always have a negative
impact on local business, yet recommends that “municipalities considering implementing, or expanding, a casino development strategy” consider the potential for cannibalization and shifts in the
marketplace.163 Local governments will be forced to sort out the
consequences of these and other types of shifts in their municipal
economies, whether the end results for the community are negative
or positive.
3. Land Use
The process of introducing gaming touches on many aspects of
land use and related law. Land use planning for gaming “involves
every level of government—state, regional, county and local. Further, the most effective approach will encompass all of those potentially divergent interests.”164 Municipalities who choose to, or are
160. See id. at 332.
161. See William R. Eadington, The Spread of Casinos in Tourism Development, in
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN TOURISM DEVELOPMENT 127, 131-34 (Douglas G. Pearce
& Richard W. Butler eds., 2002); Rychlak, supra note 15, at 329 (“Gambling does not,
however, create money out of thin air. It only transfers funds from losing gamblers to
casinos, lucky winners, and the state. That money comes from losing players, who are
often residents of the state.”).
162. NGISC, supra note 56, at 2-8 (defining “cannibalization” as “the phenomenon
where the apparent increased economic activity produced by a casino may actually be
the result of its having drained money away from local non-gambling businesses”);
see, e.g., George G. Fenich & Kathryn Hashimoto, Perceptions of Cannibalization:
What Is the Real Effect of Casinos on Restaurants?, 8 GAMING L. REV. 247, 247 (2004)
(“[W]hile many in the business community welcome casino development, one particular segment vehemently opposes it: the food and beverage segment. They claim that
casinos, through their use of complimentary food and beverages (comps) to gamblers,
will adversely affect the restaurant business segment outside the casinos, and local
operators will not be able to compete with the higher wages paid by the casinos.”).
163. Id. at 258.
164. Hawkins, supra note 117, at 794 (positing that a task force charged with correlating the different zoning systems and plans could be useful in ensuring efficient land
use planning regarding casino gaming).

R
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forced to, embrace gaming frequently lose some level of control
over land use,165 an area of law historically left to local government
discretion.166 One key area of concern for municipalities is their
ability to modify or use existing zoning laws in the process of determining where casinos will be located as zoning laws in many jurisdictions were drafted before casino gaming was legal.167 Therefore,
despite requirements that casinos be licensed and located in accordance with local zoning provisions, local control can be stripped
away if licensing decisions are entrusted entirely to state controlled
administrative agencies.168
A striking example of local actors eliminated from one of the
most sensitive aspects of governmental control over land use is the
statutory grant of eminent domain powers to the New Jersey Casino Reinvestment Development Authority.169 As the power to enforce eminent domain is grounded in showing a valid public
purpose for the use of the land, using taken land for new casino
properties has potential for great controversy, as the properties are
privately owned, for-profit institutions. In Detroit the potential
use of eminent domain to secure waterfront property for casino
facilities created much commotion,170 despite the fact that the actions were taken by the city itself.171

165. See, e.g., McClenathan, supra note 149, at 116 (“[I]n New York a broad grant
of authority by the state legislature to the Division of Lottery, environmental impact
determinations, which are required under the State Environmental Quality Review
Act (SEQRA), have been made by the Division of Lottery, not the local government
where the racino is located.”). McClenathan posits that this could have negative results on existing land use plans. See id.
166. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
167. See McClenathan, supra note 149, at 114-15 (positing that local land use planners would not have envisioned casinos in their municipality’s comprehensive plan
because casinos are technically illegal in the State of New York).
168. See Pa. Gaming Control Bd. v. City Council of Phila., 928 A.2d 1255, 1266-69
(Pa. 2007) (holding that in accordance with title 4, sections 1304(b)(1) and 1307 of the
Pennsylvania Code, the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board has the sole authority to
locate gaming facilities, yet implementation must be “according to the zoning and
land use provisions a city has enacted”).
169. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-182 (West 1996); see supra note 51 and accompanying text.
170. See generally Frank Aiello, Gambling with Condemnation: An Examination of
Detroit’s Use of Eminent Domain for Riverfront Casinos, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1639
(2000) (concluding that condemnation under eminent domain is inappropriate for acquiring land to be used for casinos, despite potential public benefits related to economic development).
171. Id.

R
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CASE STUDIES

Pennsylvania Case Study
1.

Background

The process of bringing casinos to Pennsylvania has followed a
long and winding road despite the fact that the state already played
host to lottery and pari-mutuel gaming. Beginning in the early
1990’s, the state considered various proposals to bring gaming to
the state in one form or another.172 One major push by gambling
proponents was the Excursion Boat Gambling Act for Waterfront
Economic Development, which ultimately failed to pass into law
over two sessions of the Pennsylvania General Assembly.173 This
failed attempt at bringing gaming to the state was similar to legislation in other states that chose to introduce riverboat gambling contingent on voter approval in local referenda. Pennsylvania
considered riverboat gaming in the 1999-2000 General Assembly
Session, but again failed to enact legislation enabling casino gaming.174 The failed bill sought to enable slot machine gaming at existing racetrack facilities as well as riverboat gaming.175 The bill
made potential gaming licenses contingent on voter approval in
statewide and local referenda.176 Gaming legislation once again
failed to become part of Pennsylvania Law during the 2001-2002
session. This turbulent background paved the way for the eventual
legislative acts that would bring casinos to Pennsylvania.
2.

The Pennsylvania Race Horse Development and Gaming Act

Slots gaming finally became a reality in Pennsylvania on July 5,
2004 when Governor Edward F. Rendell signed the Pennsylvania
Race Horse Development and Gaming Act (“PRGA”) into law.177
172. See Delva, supra note 28, at 868 (detailing various attempts to pass riverboat
gaming legislation in Pennsylvania).
173. H.B. 1883, 1993 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1993); H.B. 939, 1995 Gen Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1995). H.B. 1883 had been left pending at the close of the 19931994 session and was “reintroduced with some changes.” Delva, supra note 28, at 868
n.153.
174. H.B. 328, 1999 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1999).
175. Id.
176. Id. (requiring voters at both the state and local levels to approve of slots at
existing racetrack facilities and riverboat gaming independently). The legislation as
drafted gave voters the power to approve of slot machines at an existing racetrack
while prohibiting an expansion into riverboat-based operations in their county or municipality. See id.
177. H.B. 2330, 2004 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2004). H.B. 2330 began as a
one-page bill directing “the Pennsylvania State Police to provide the State Harness
and Horse Racing Commission with criminal background checks and fingerprint date

R
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The PRGA provided for slots gambling in a variety of settings
across Pennsylvania; at existing pari-mutuel gaming facilities, at
stand-alone slots parlors, and at facilities requiring a hotel and recreational facilities.178 Unlike previous attempts to introduce slots
gaming, the PRGA did not reserve any power for voters to stop
gaming.179 Additionally, the PRGA gave the power to make all
licensing and locating decisions to the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board (“PGCB”).180
The PRGA proved controversial from the outset. In December
of 2004, petitioners, including concerned citizens and politicians,
sued the Pennsylvania Commonwealth and individual government
officials for injunctive relief, asserting various claims regarding the
constitutionality of the PRGA.181 The most significant substantive
claim was that section 1506182 of the PRGA improperly delegated
“unrestricted land use and zoning authority and power to the gaming control board without providing clear, definite and reasonable
on applicants for licenses.” Brian D. Kravetz, The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Sustains the Constitutionality of the Gaming Act: Pennsylvanians Against Gambling
Expansion Fund, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 44 DUQ. L. REV. 551 (2006). During the
required considerations by the House and Senate the bill evolved into 145 pages and
became the Pennsylvania Race Horse Development and Gaming Act on July 1, 2004.
Id. The House passed the bill on July 3, 2004 and the Senate on July 4, 2004. H.B.
2330.
178. 4 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1302, 1304-1305 (West 2008).
179. See supra notes 172-176 and accompanying text.
180. 4 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 1202(b)(12), 1304(b) (West 2008).
181. Pennsylvanians Against Gambling Expansion Fund, Inc. v. Commonwealth,
877 A.2d 383 (Pa. 2005).
182. Title 4, section 1506 of the Pennsylania Code in its original form read as
follows:
The conduct of gaming as permitted under this part, including the physical
location of any licensed facility, shall not be prohibited or otherwise regulated by any ordinance, home rule charter provision, resolution, rule or regulation of any political subdivision or any local or State instrumentality or
authority that relates to zoning or land use to the extent that the licensed
facility has been approved by the board. The board may, in its discretion
consider such local zoning ordinances when considering an application for a
slot machine license. The board shall provide the political subdivision,
within which an applicant for a slot machine license has proposed to locate a
licensed gaming facility, a 60-day comment period prior to the board’s final
approval, condition or denial of approval of its application for a slot machine
license. The political subdivision may make recommendations to the board
for improvements to the applicant’s proposed site plans that take into account the impact on the local community, including, but not limited to, land
use and transportation impact. This section shall also apply to any proposed
racetrack or licensed racetrack.
Law of July 5, 2004, 4 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §1506 (West 2004) (current version at 4
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1506 (2006)).
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lawful standards, policies and limitations to protect against unfettered board action.”183 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed
with the petitioners, holding section 1506 unconstitutional as “the
General Assembly has failed to provide adequate standards and
guidelines required to delegate, constitutionally, the power and authority to execute or administer that provision of the Act to the
Board.”184
The original language of the statute clearly indicates that the
General Assembly sought to take away any and all aspects of control related to locating casino properties from local government actors. While the court did not sever section 1506 as a means of
granting local governments power to influence the process of casino introduction in Pennsylvania, such was the end result. The
legislature amended the statute; section 1506 provides in its current
form:
§ 1506. Licensed facility zoning and land use appeals
In order to facilitate timely implementation of casino gaming
as provided in this part, notwithstanding [title 42, section
933(a)(2) of the Pennsylvania Code] (relating to appeals from
government agencies), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is
vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction to consider appeals of a final order, determination or decision of a political
subdivision or local instrumentality involving zoning, usage,
layout, construction or occupancy, including location, size,
bulk and use of a licensed facility. The court, as appropriate,
may appoint a master to hear an appeal under this section.185

Although the amended statute allows local governments to retain
control over significant land use matters, any such action taken by
local governments could be interpreted as contrary to the sole
power of the PGCB to determine the location of gaming facilities
in Pennsylvania.186
Industry insiders and gaming experts also criticized the PGRA.
Professor I. Nelson Rose, a leading authority on gaming law,
blamed the law’s shortcomings on the character of gambling related politics in Pennsylvania.187 Rose stated that “[b]ecause the
Pennsylvania slot machine legislation was the result of years of political fights, it is not a model of what gaming regulation should
183. Brief in Support of Petition Seeking Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief at 49, Pennsylvanians, 877 A.2d 383 (Pa. 2004) (No. 229 MM).
184. Pennsylvanians, 877 A.2d at 419.
185. 4 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1506 (West 2008).
186. See id. § 1304(b).
187. See Rose, New Slot Law, supra note 64, at 112.
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look like.”188 Specifically, Rose critiqued the method of appointing
members to the PGCB, as a complicated voting system designed to
ensure party parity189 and a stipulation that would permit “legislators and other public officials to own up to 1% of a slot
operator.”190
Critics of the PGRA also felt that the law was not well suited for
the cities of Philadelphia and Pittsburgh as the law only enabled
slots gaming.191 Detractors of this aspect of the law included casino
mogul Steve Wynn, and Philadelphia political insider Paul Levy.192
Along with others, Wynn and Levy felt that by only allowing slot
machines, the law would not serve to increase tourism.193 Wynn
went as far as saying “[i]t’s a dumb law,” even calling it “an Atlantic City support bill.”194 Slots-only parlors cater mostly to local
customers, and are known in the industry as “casinos of convenience” for this reason.195 Recently casino operators have shown
that restaurants, shops and other entertainment venues within casinos can be more profitable than gaming itself.196 It is also well
known that slots parlors lack the mystique and glamour associated
with table games which “attract younger, more upscale players and
well-heeled tourists,” the segments of the market who have the disposable income to spend money on hotel rooms, shopping sprees
and other expenditures that would help to bring diverse economic
development to the city.197
Nonetheless, the PGRA was on the books and casinos were destined for Philadelphia, prompting City Council to enact Ordinance
No. 051028-AA on February 23, 2006.198 The ordinance added
Chapter 14-400 to the section of the Philadelphia Code regulating
zoning and planning.199 The Ordinance created a new zoning clas188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. Rose explains that 1% ownership was actually a compromise as well, as
the Pennsylvania Senate had originally proposed a 5% cap. Id.
191. Inga Saffron, Is a Downtown Casino in the Cards?, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 21,
2005, at A01. Levy ran both the Center City District, a business development district,
and also the site selection committee for the mayor’s gaming task force.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. Id.
195. See id.
196. See id. See, e.g., AGA SURVEY, supra note 10, at 35 (finding that 49% of
survey respondents said that food, shows, entertainment and everything else at casinos was more fun than gambling itself).
197. Saffron, supra note 191.
198. HSP Gaming, L.P. v. City Council, 939 A.2d 273, 275 (Pa. 2007).
199. See id.
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sification, Commercial Entertainment Districts (“CED”), to facilitate the introduction of casinos to the city in accordance with
PGCB’s licensing determinations.200 The new law was carefully
drafted as to avoid conflicting with the PGRA and the sole authority of the PGCB to make all casino licensing decisions. The code
specified that once an applicant had been licensed, the applicant
would submit a proposal to the City Planning Commission and
upon approval of said plan, the site would be rezoned as a CED,
superseding existing zoning classifications, thereby allowing for the
development of gaming facilities.201 Through this act, Philadelphia
legislators prepared to receive the yet to be determined slots licensees destined for the city.
3.

The Hearing Process for the Philadelphia Slots Licenses

The next step in the process of making casino gaming a reality in
Pennsylvania was the review of applications for gaming licenses by
the PGCB. The process was governed by section 1205 of the
PRGA, which required that “consideration and resolution of all
license or permit applications” would be conducted in accordance
with title 2 of the Pennsylvania Code, or “procedures adopted by
order of the board.”202 The statute expressly grants the board the
ability to deliberate without affording applicants an oral hearing.203
Despite the inability for local actors to exert actual control over the
process of choosing licensees, section 1205(b) of the PRGA obligates the board to conduct at least one public input hearing before
licensing a facility.204 Public input hearings must “be held in the
municipality where the facility will be located and shall be organized in cooperation with the municipality.”205 Public input hearings
were the lone opportunity for Philadelphians to weigh in with the
PGCB regarding casino gaming in their city.
Determining which applicants would be awarded licenses was
governed primarily by eligibility requirements that focused on diverse employment plans and suitability to be involved in the gaming industry.206 The board was also provided with ten factors to
consider in evaluating which license applicants were best suited to
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

See id.
See id.
4 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1205(a) (West 2008).
See id.
See id. § 1205(b).
Id.
See id. § 1325(b).
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serve the stated goals of enabling gaming in Pennsylvania.207
While the majority of the factors related to diversity and the potential for job creation, other issues of local concern were to be considered. Two of the factors are issues of great concern for local
government and residents. First, section 1325(1) asked the board
to evaluate “the location and quality of the proposed facility, including, but not limited to, road and transit access, parking and
centrality to market service area.”208 Second, section 1325(9) takes
into account “[t]he degree to which potential adverse effects might
result from the project, including costs of meeting the increased
demand for public health care, child care, public transportation, affordable housing and social services, will be mitigated.”209
The licensing process for the Philadelphia casinos officially began on December 28, 2005, the deadline for applications.210 The
board received five applications for the two licenses available for
facilities in Philadelphia and voted on the applicants at an open
meeting on December 20, 2006.211 As part of the decision-making
process and in accordance with the PRGA, the board held Public
Input Hearings on April 10, 11, and 12 of 2006.212 Each applicant
submitted a traffic study as part of their application to address concerns related to increased traffic, a major concern of Philadelphia
residents.213 The board cooperated with the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation and a private firm to consider the traffic
studies and proposed mitigation modifications related to each applicant’s plan for developing a casino.214 Yet, the Philadelphia Department of Streets was entirely left out of the process of
evaluating significant potential impacts of placing a casino at any
one of the five proposed locations within the city. The board released their final Order and Adjudication on February 1, 2007, approving licenses for HSP Gaming, LP (SugarHouse Casino) and
Philadelphia Entertainment & Development Partners, LP
(Foxwoods Casino Philadelphia).215
207. Id. § 1325(c).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See HSP Gaming LP, Case No . 1356 (Feb. 1, 2007) (http://pgcb.state.pa.us/
files/adjudications/Cat2_PHL_OA.pdf).
211. See id. at 7.
212. Id. at 4.
213. See id. at 14.
214. See id.
215. Id.
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The Aftermath

Since the board announced their choice of casino licensees, the
process of implementing casino gambling has been tumultuous.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has been busy sorting out a host
of lawsuits. Concerned individuals along with four civic associations and a failed casino license applicant separately sued the gaming board in relation to their choice of applicants.216 After the
board’s licensing decisions were validated by the court,217 the
Board took legal action itself and filed suit in an effort to stop Philadelphia’s City Council from holding a referendum vote to determine if the city charter should be amended in consideration of the
impending arrival of casinos to the city.218 Under the proposed
amendment:
[L]icensed facilities cannot be located on the sites that the
Board approved, City Council cannot designate these sites as
CEDs under Chapter 14-400 of the Philadelphia Code, and the
City’s Department of Licenses and Inspection cannot issue the
permits that would be needed to develop the sites into gaming
facilities.219

Despite an attempt the block the referendum by Mayor John
Street, the Council voted to override the Mayor’s veto and put the
issue in hands of its constituents.220 Consequently, the PGCB filed
an emergency petition for review to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in attempt to prevent the potential charter amendment from
being included in the next ballot.221
In an opinion dated August 3, 2007, the court found that they
had proper jurisdiction to hear the case pursuant to section 1506.
The court stated, “the Ordinance is a determination or decision
made by a political subdivision involving, inter alia, the location of
licensed facilities.”222 The court stated that under sections 1304
and 1307 of the gaming act, “the General Assembly intended for
216. See Society Hill Civic Ass’n v. Pa. Gaming Control Bd., 928 A.2d 175 (Pa.
2007); Riverwalk Casino, L.P. v. Pa. Gaming Control Bd., 926 A.2d 926 (Pa. 2007).
217. Id.
218. See Pa. Gaming Control Bd. v. City Council, 932 A.2d 869 (Pa. 2007).
219. Pa. Gaming Control Bd. v. City Council, 928 A.2d 1255, 1261-62 (Pa. 2007).
Commercial Entertainment Districts (“CEDs”) were established in the Philadelphia
Code in March of 2006. When property was designated by the City Council as a
CED, all underlying zoning restrictions would be superseded. Section 14-405 explicitly reserves the power to locate gaming facilities in the city to the PGCB and provides that CED status would in no way interfere with that licensing process. Id.
220. See id. at 1261.
221. See id. at 1262.
222. Id. at 1264.
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the Board to have the sole authority to locate Category 2 licensed
facilities in cities of the first class . . . [and] the General Assembly
has not afforded the electorate of a first class city the right to consider, affect or override the Board’s location decision.”223 The
court next stated that the local government had influence over
gaming related matters, through their power to zone. “After the
Board’s decision on location is made, the General Assembly intends for it to be implemented under and according to the zoning
and land use provisions a city has enacted.”224 Finally the court
engaged in a brief explanation of the relationship of Philadelphia,
as a home rule city, to the Commonwealth and held that the Ordinance was directly in conflict with the Gaming Act and therefore
constituted an “unlawful and unconstitutional exercise of power,”
and granted the Board a permanent injunction.225 Thus, the Philadelphia City Council was limited to post hoc involvement in gaming-enabling process, issuing zoning approvals and related permits
for the locations already approved by the PGCB.
This lawsuit did not serve to end the feuding between the city,
the casino licensees, the PGCB, and the state. On October 25,
2007, HSP Gaming L.P. took the city to court to force their hand in
designating their intended casino site as a CED in accordance with
the city’s code in order to comply with their statutory duties of
implementing the licensing decision of the board.226 In a lengthy
opinion, the court ordered that the site be re-zoned as a CED, that
HSP’s development plan be declared “finally approved,” and the
city take all necessary steps to comply with the courts order.227
Later that year, Foxwoods went to the state’s highest court in order
to obtain similar relief.228 The court refused Foxwoods’s request,
leaving the matter in the hands of the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas.229
Zoning approval did not spell the end of controversy surrounding HSP’s planned SugarHouse casino, as the firm needed to obtain a license for riparian rights on the bank of the Delaware River.
After the administration of Mayor John Street granted HSP a license to use the land in November of 2007, a petition was filed
223. Id. at 1267-68.
224. Id. at 1269.
225. Id. at 1270.
226. HSP Gaming, L.P. v. City Council, 939 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. 2007).
227. Id. at 288.
228. See Larry King, Foxwoods Loses High-Court Ruling, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec.
12, 2007, at B02.
229. See id.
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claiming that only the state had the power to issue riparian
rights.230 On January 24, 2008, the newly elected mayor of Philadelphia, Michael Nutter, revoked HSP’s riparian license, claiming a
flawed process that needed to be reevaluated.231 On February 11,
2008, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court announced that they would
rule on the issue of whether the state or the city had proper authority to issues the riparian rights license.232
Over two years after the PGCB announced the winning casino
license applicants, construction has yet to begin on either the Sugarhouse or the Foxwoods properties. It is evident that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court as well as the Philadelphia Court of
Common pleas will remain intimately involved in the process of
implementing gaming in the city. What remains unclear is how
much more time and money the interested parties will spend on
negotiation and litigation before Philadelphians hear the sounds of
slots machines ringing within city limits.
B.
1.

Detroit

The Michigan Gaming Control and Revenue Act

The effort to bring casinos to Detroit provides an interesting
contrast to the current situation in Philadelphia, as the enabling
process provided a role for voters and local governments actors.
Unlike Pennsylvania, where lotteries and pari-mutuel gaming were
the only in-state gambling options, Michigan hosted Native American-owned casinos.233 Seven tribes operated seventeen casinos in
Michigan by the end of 1996; the year voters approved legislation
providing for three land-based casinos in Detroit.234 While efforts
to legalize casino gaming in Detroit had been in the works since
the 1970’s, no action had been taken by the state other than entering into gaming compacts with sovereign tribes.235 The arrival of
casino gaming in Windsor, Ontario, Canada, directly across the De230. Marcia Gelbart, Nutter Revokes Casino License, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 25,
2008, at A01.
231. See id.
232. Jeff Shields, Pa. High Court to Rule on City’s Say over Casino Permit, PHILA.
INQUIRER, Feb. 12, 2008, at B04.
233. MICH. GAMING CONTROL BD., HISTORY OF GAMING IN MICHIGAN, http://
www.michigan.gov/mgcb/0,1607,7-120-1382_1453-11371—,00.html (last visited Sept.
14, 2008).
234. Id.
235. See id.
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troit River from Detroit in 1994 spurred lawmakers in Michigan to
give serious consideration to the subject.236
On September 8, 1994, Michigan Governor John Engler created
the Governor’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Michigan Gaming to
assess the issue of expansion of gaming in the state.237 The order
specified twelve issues for the Commission to study and craft recommendations for the Governor and Michiganders consideration,
including “[w]hether additional gaming is desirable and beneficial
and should be authorized by the legislature or Governor[,]” and
“[w]hether the economic benefits from the legalization and establishment of land-based casinos and/or riverboat casinos in Detroit
or other proposed locations around the state would outweigh any
potential social or economic harm that may result.”238 The Commission responded positively to both inquiries.239 In response to
the baseline question of whether additional gaming should be authorized in the Michigan the report concluded that “[l]imited expansion of casino gaming in Michigan would be beneficial since it
could add significantly to the state’s economy, contribute additional tax revenues to local and state governments, provide an additional attraction for tourism and help to capture Michigan
gaming dollars now being exported.”240 The fact that gaming options were already available to Michiganders was of significant importance to the Commission.241 The report also stated that
“[a]pproval of the voters should be received before any casino may
be constructed in a local community[,]” and that “[d]uring negotiations with prospective owners/operators, the state should consult
with the local government involved, especially on matters dealing
with law enforcement and zoning.”242 Following the report, the
Michigan lawmakers took action in the hopes of introducing commercial casinos to the state, all of which would be located in the
city of Detroit.
236. See, e.g., THE GOVERNOR’S BLUE RIBBON COMM’N, BLUE RIBBON REPORT
(1995), available at http://www.michigan.gov/mgcb/0,1607,7-120-1382_1452-14473—
,00.html.
237. See id; see also Exec. Order No. 1994-24 (1994), available at http://
www.michigan.gov/mgcb/0,1607,7-120-1382_1452-14474—,00.html.
238. Id.
239. See GOVERNOR’S BLUE RIBBON COMM’N, supra note 236.
240. Id.
241. See id. (“Michigan is in the untenable position of having casino-gaming readily
accessible to its residents within and near the state, of having negative impacts, yet
being without the revenue or benefits to help counter the problems.”).
242. Id.
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The gaming question was presented to Michiganders as Proposal
E on Michigan’s November 5, 1996, general election ballot.243 The
voters approved the proposal by a slim margin, with 51.5% of votes
in the affirmative.244 The Governor then signed into law an
amended version of the Michigan Gaming Control and Revenue
Act (“MGCRA”).245 The law provided for three casino facilities
and established the Michigan Gaming Control Board (“MGCB:) to
handle regulatory and licensing functions for the industry.246 The
MGCRA gave local lawmakers and Detroit residents a significant
role in developing casino gaming in the city. Detroit citizens had
multiple opportunities to vote on casino gaming in their city.
These citizens first participated in the statewide general election by
voting on Proposal E.247 Next they were able to vote pursuant to
the MGCRA, as the act requires majority of voters in a city must
approve of casino gaming in order for the licensing process to
begin.248
2.

Local Control: The Development Agreement

The Mayor of Detroit and the City Council were directly involved in establishing casinos in the city. Under section
432.206(1)(b) of the Michigan Code, before the MGCB could issue
a gaming license, the operator making the proposal had to enter
into a development agreement with a city that had “enacted an
ordinance approving of gaming.”249 Additionally, under the Act, a
city eligible for a casino was able to enact ordinances “governing
243. MICH. GAMING CONTROL BD., supra note 66. The ballot read as follows:
A Legislative Initiative to Permit Casino Gaming in Qualified Cities
The proposed law would:
1. Permit up to three gaming casinos in any city that meets the following
qualifications: has a population of 800,000 or more; is located within 100
miles of any other state or country in which gaming is permitted; and has
had casino gaming approved by a majority of the voters in the city.
2. Establish a Gaming Control Board to regulate casino gaming.
3. Impose an 18% state tax on gross gaming revenues.
4. Allocate 55% of tax revenue to the host city for crime prevention and
economic development; allocate remaining 45% of tax funds to state for
public education.
Id.
244. Id.
245. See Authority for Temporary Casinos under Michigan Gaming Control and
Revenue Act, Op. Att’y Gen. No. 7008, (Mar. 2, 1999), available at http://
www.ag.state.mi.us/opinion/datafiles/1990s/op10079.htm.
246. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 432.201 (West 2001).
247. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
248. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 432.202 (l)(iii) (West 2001).
249. Id. § 432.206 (1)(b).
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casino operations, occupational licensees and suppliers.”250 The
Act clearly explained the purpose and breadth of the “development agreements”:
§ 2(r) “Development agreement” means a written agreement
between a city and a person naming the person as the designated developer of a casino in the city and covering certain subjects including, but not limited to: approval by the city of the
location of the casino; certification by the city that the applicant
has sufficient financial resources to construct and open the casino which it proposes to develop; zoning and site plan requirements; utility connection fees; infrastructure improvements;
requirements to utilize local businesses and small businesses as
suppliers; employment issues; compulsive gambling programs;
insurance requirements; conceptual design approval; reimbursement for predevelopment and infrastructure costs, traffic engineering, and other transportation costs; plans for completion of
destination attractions either within or outside the casino facility
and ancillary development rights.251

Therefore, the Mayor and the City Council were able to take
into consideration many aspects of the proposed casinos and negotiate with potential licensees about their projects. On November
20, 1997, Detroit Mayor Dennis Archer announced his choice of
three casino operators from the eleven proposals that had been
submitted earlier that year.252 The chosen operators were Atwater/
Circus Circus (Detroit Entertainment, LLC),253 Greektown/Sault
Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians (Greektown Casino, LLC),
and MGM Grand (MGM Grand Detroit Casino, LLC).254 The
Mayor finalized the development agreements with the three potential operators on March 12, 1998, followed by the City Council on
April 9, 1998.255 This allowed the MGCB to begin the process of
investigating the applicants to determine if they should be awarded
an operator’s license.256 In June of 1998, the City Council adopted
an ordinance to legalize gaming in the city, the final step necessary
before the gaming board could conduct background investiga250. Id. § 432.206 (1)(a).
251. Id. § 432.202 (r).
252. MICH. GAMING CONTROL BD., supra note 233.
253. The Detroit Entertainment Group’s Casino project would eventually be
named MotorCity Casino. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
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tions.257 Later that month the Mayor approved proposals from the
operators to open temporary facilities: the City Council approved
the amended development agreements the following month.258
The MGCB supported the amended agreements, verifying that
temporary facilities were allowable under the MGCRA issuing
Resolution 1998-06.259 Temporary facilities were permitted to promote timely implementation of the MGCRA and get the casinos
up and running.
3. The Casino Era in Detroit
The Mayor’s and City Council’s approvals did not guarantee a
development agreement for a potential casino licensee. On August
4, 1998, Detroit citizens voted to support the Mayor’s choices.260
After the development agreements were approved, the MGCB
awarded the first Detroit casino licenses in 1999.261 On July 29,
1999, the MGM Grand Detroit began casino gaming operations,
followed by MotorCity Casino262 on December 14 of that year.263
The third Detroit facility, Greektown Casino, received its license
on November 8, 2000.264 All three of the casinos operated successfully under their temporary status, as the city continued to evaluate
plans for permanent casinos. In 2000, the first full year of gaming
in Detroit, the casinos produced over $60 million in tax revenue for
the city and state.265
257. MICH. GAMING CONTROL BD., HISTORICAL TIMELINE: SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
RELATED TO CASINO GAMING IN MICHIGAN [hereinafter HISTORICAL TIMELINE],
http://www.state.mi.us/mgcb/timelin2.htm, (last visited Mar. 5, 2008). The Casino
Gaming Authorization & Casino Development Agreement & Compliance Ordinance
on June 17, 1998, establishing both the legality of gaming in the city and a process for
ensuring that license applicants comply with their development agreements with Detroit. Id.
258. Id.
259. MICH. GAMING CONTROL BD. RES. 1998-06, available at http://www.state.mi.
us/mgcb/rz-9806.htm#rz. In March of 1999, Michigan Attorney General Jennifer
Granholm issued a written opinion validating the legality of casinos opening in temporary facilities. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 7008, supra note 245.
260. HISTORICAL TIMELINE, supra note 257; David Goodman, Casinos Face Barrier
in Detroit, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Sept. 26, 1998, available at http://www.reviewjournal.
com/lvrj_home/1998/Sep-26-Sat-1998/business/8290638.html.
261. MICH. GAMING CONTROL BD. DETROIT CASINO INFORMATION, http://
www.michigan.gov/mgcb/0,1607,7-120-1380_1412—-,00.html (last visited Sept. 6,
2008).
262. See supra note 254.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. MICH. GAMING CONTROL BD., 2000 ANNUAL CASINO REVENUE REPORT,
http://michigan.gov/mgcb/0,1607,7-120-1395_1469_7138—-,00.html (last visited Sept.
6, 2008).
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Although the temporary facilities were operating successfully,
the road to permanent casinos in Detroit proved bumpy. In January 2002, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
decided Lac Vieux Desert Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Michigan Gaming Control Board,266 holding that aspects of
the licensing process had been unconstitutional. Chief Judge Martin F. Boyce, Jr. held that the ordinance legalizing casino gaming in
Detroit, section 18-13-1(i) of the Detroit City Code, provided an
unfair advantage to two license applicants.267 In September of that
year, the court issued an injunction preventing the construction of
permanent casinos in Detroit.268 Over the next three years, the interested parties battled in both the Western District of Michigan
and the Sixth Circuit.269 Eventually, the Lac Vieux tribe entered in
settlement agreements with Atwater/Detroit Entertainment and
Greektown, which were approved by the Western District in April
of 2004.270 On April 28, 2005, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district
court’s approval of the settlement agreement and consent decree,
dismissing any remaining appeals and dissolving the injunction.271
With the legal hurdles cleared, the city and the casino operators
were able to begin the process of developing permanent casinos in
Detroit, as the City Council approved rezoning of the sites for
MotorCity and Greektown the following day, April 29, 2005.272
Despite these hurdles, casinos have been nonetheless profitable
for the owners, the state of Michigan, and the city itself. Over
1999-2006, the three Detroit casinos paid over $743 million in
taxes.273 2007 was a landmark year for the casino industry and
MGCB in Detroit, as the MGM Grand Detroit opened its doors on
October 3, 2007,274 and MotorCity Casino Hotel opened its permanent facility on November 28, 2007.275 Greektown expects to open
their permanent facility, on the same location as the temporary ca266. 276 F.3d 876, 878 (6th Cir. 2002).
267. Id. at 877, 78.
268. Greta Guest, Ruling Allows Detroit’s Casinos to Build Permanent Facilities,
DETROIT FREE PRESS, Apr. 29, 2005 (on file with author).
269. See Lac Vieux Desert Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Mich. Gaming Control Bd., 129 F. App’x 938 (6th Cir. 2005).
270. See Guest, supra note 268.
271. Lac Vieux, 129 F. App’x at 942.
272. Robert Ankeny, Work on Permanent Casinos Takes a Step Forward, CRAIN’S
DETROIT BUS. 38, May 9, 2005, at 38.
273. DETROIT CASINO REVENUE REPORTS, http://michigan.gov/mgcb/0,1607,7-1201395_1469_7138—-,00.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2008).
274. Joel J. Smith, MGM’s Grand Opening, DETROIT NEWS, Oct. 3, 2007, at A1.
275. Joel J. Smith, MotorCity Casino Hotel Opens to Public, DETROIT NEWS, Nov.
29, 2007 (on file with author).
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sino, sometime during 2008.276 Like the other two facilities, the
new Greektown property will include a hotel and expanded retail
and dining options for casino patrons.
V.

COMPARING THE GAMING-ENABLING PROCESS
PHILADELPHIA AND DETROIT

IN

“The development of gambling policy has been incremental,
even piecemeal, and has progressed for the most part without significant rational consideration of the longer-term impacts for the
states and localities in which is occurs.”277
The commercial casino industry in America has seen great
growth and expansion in recent years. As legislators in states lacking casino-enabling legislation see the increased tax revenues and
other benefits of commercial gaming accruing to their peers, many
will likely take action to introduce casinos. While some lawmakers
might be reluctant to get into the gaming business, the goal of
preventing tax dollars from leaving their jurisdiction may force
their hand as gaming options develop in their neighboring states.
In drafting new legislation, states can best serve their constituents
by engaging local actors in the enabling and licensing process. Local participation is of great importance when casinos are introduced to metropolitan areas: properly protecting the interests of
the residents of these regions is already a difficult task. Local involvement is critical at two stages of gaming-enabling: passing laws
to enable commercial gaming and during the casino operator licensing process. As the first278 major cities to deal with the issue,
comparing the development of gaming in Philadelphia and Detroit
provides a stark contrast in efficiency in introducing casino
gambling.
A.

Mode of Legalization

Beginning with enabling gaming at the state legislative level, it
was clear that local actors would have a significant impact on the
casino issue in Detroit. In Michigan the question of legalizing gaming at all was put in the hands of the electorate. While the initial
question of gaming was presented to voters outside of the city, the
gaming statute requires the approval of the majority of Detroit vot276. See Greektown Casino Website, General Information Section, http://www.
greektowncasino.com/GeneralInfo/2008.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2008).
277. VON HERMANN, supra note 25, at 30.
278. Unlike Philadelphia and Detroit, Las Vegas has developed into a major city
because of casinos.
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ers. Additionally, licensure required that the “local legislative
body” of Detroit pass an ordinance approving gaming. Citizens of
Detroit were also able to participate in the process by taking to the
polls and voting. Most significantly, before the city’s development
agreements with potential operators were considered final, Detroit
citizens were able to voice their opinion on who would own the
Detroit casinos and more importantly, where they would be
located.
In stark contrast, in Pennsylvania, after years of failed legislative
attempts to enable casino gaming, the General Assembly hurriedly
pushed through legislation to bring slots gaming to locations across
the commonwealth. The PGCA did not provide citizens at either
the state or local levels to participate in the decision-making process. Neither the Mayor’s nor the Philadelphia City Council’s approval was required to authorize casino gaming. Furthermore,
when the City Council attempted to empower their electorate, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court employed reasoning solidly grounded
in Dillon’s Rule to preclude local involvement in gaming. Both the
PGCA and the court’s holding ultimately left many Philadelphians
feeling disenfranchised.
Although it is likely that there is no way for lawmakers to prevent opposition to gaming on every front, giving the citizens most
likely to feel the impact of gaming an opportunity to voice their
opinion is important. Simply providing voters with the opportunity
of participating in referenda, or allowing their local elected officials
significant participation in the matter serves to promote democracy
and empower citizens.
B.

Local Involvement in the Licensing Process

The MGCA provided Detroit politicians with the opportunity to
shape the face of casino gaming in their city. By requiring that
applicants enter into development agreements with the city, the act
gave Detroit a significant amount of control over who would be
able to open a casino, and more importantly where in the city the
could do it. Primarily municipal concerns such as zoning, site
plans, and infrastructure were entrusted to the actors with the
greatest expertise. The process of evaluating casino proposals
before entering into development agreements allowed the city to
assess which potential licensee’s plans to would most benefit the
city and its residents. Even more importantly, the city’s elected
officials were able to evaluate the impact that an individual property and casino gaming generally would have on their city by grant-
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ing temporary development agreements. Detroit politicians have
thus been able to use casino gambling in coordination with other
projects to begin revitalizing the city.
The situation in Philadelphia once again provides a stark contrast. The PGRA granted every responsibility related to introducing gaming to Pennsylvania to the PGCB, not allowing local
government any meaningful involvement in the licensing process.
Precluded from taking action before or during the licensing process, members of the disenfranchised Philadelphia City Council
sought to force their way into the decision-making process, but
they were ultimately denied. In line with the rest of the PGRA,
the parties with the best ability to evaluate issues of local concern
were left out of critical stages in the process. Philadelphia legislators’ influence over the introduction of gaming was reduced to limited zoning determinations in the wake of the PGCB’s licensing
decisions. Ultimately time will tell if city lawmakers and citizens
are able to exert meaningful influence over the Philadelphia
casinos.
CONCLUSION
U.S. Supreme Court Justice David Souter faced the subject of
gaming during his tenure as the Attorney General of New Hampshire. Souter argued against bringing casinos to the state as it
would attract visitors to his home state for the wrong reasons, and
more importantly, gambling “would change the character of the
part of the world closest to us.”279 This statement clearly articulates the reason local government should be involved in the gaming
licensing and location decision making process.
There is no doubt that the introduction of casinos will have a
major impact on any city or other locality. This is not a question of
whether or not gaming will be beneficial, but a concern that arises
once the state has determined that the benefits outweigh the burdens. Even if the state government excludes local actors from the
enabling process, effective decisions about the location and purposes of gaming demands local involvement. An administrative
agency comprised solely of state-appointed officials who lack the
proper connection to the people and who have no direct accountability to the voters impacted by their decisions, should not have
sole decision-making authority. People who are going to be living
near and living with the casinos should have their say. While each
279. Rychlak, supra note 15, at 360 (citation omitted).
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city and state is unique and faces their own host of issues in enabling gaming, lessons can be learned from the recent events surrounding the PRGA in Philadelphia. Voters and local politicians
alike can feel spurned when they are excluded from matters as important as casino gaming. The capability for local actors to help
guide the healthy development of gambling necessarily requires
that state enabling legislation reserves a role for local governments
and voters in the process of introducing and licensing gaming operations in their municipality.
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